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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
be contrary to law for it to give to a particular charity, because its
activities bear no resemblance to the corporate business. Boards of di-
rectors are now assured that the type of charity is of no moment, so
long as the recipient meets the general statutory standards. The chil-
dren's hospital, the liberal arts college and the humane society are
qualified to receive charitable contributions from corporations whose
business enterprises may be restricted to the manufacture of rubber
tires or cosmetics or nuts and bolts. Whether such corporations are to
contribute to such charities is, within reasonable limitations as to




Labor Liens-Restaurant, Hotel, Tavern, Etc. Employees. Chapter
205 gives to persons performing labor in the operation of "any restaur-
ant, hotel, tavern, or other place of business engaged in the selling of
prepared foods or drinks, or any hotel service employee" a lien on the
earnings of and the property used in the operation of, the "said busi-
ness." It will require litigation to determine precisely what business
institutions fall within the statutory coverage. The reference to restaur-
ants and taverns is clear enough. The reference to "hotel--or any hotel
service employee" is unclear. Does it mean that all hotel employees are
beneficiaries of the statute, or only those engaged in "service" employ-
ment or employment concerned with the selling of food or drink?
The statutory language "or other place of business engaged in the
selling of prepared foods or drinks" is a particularly fruitful source of
controversy The statute does not read "engaged solely in the selling",
it refers to hotels, whose food and drink dispensing business is but a
part of the overall activity. What of other institutions a part of whose
operations is the sale of food or drinks? The usual so-called "drug"
store is an example. So is the department store or other mercantile
establishment which operates a soda fountain, lunch counter or dining
room. So is the establishment which operates a cafeteria for its em-
ployees. What of the business institution on whose premises a food
or drink vending machine is situated?
That counsel who represents employees of employers like these will
claim the benefits of the statute for their clients would seem fairly
certain. Employees of establishments like grocery stores, markets and
baked goods shops may be tempted too, since these sell food and possi-
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bly "drinks" which are "prepared" in the usually accepted sense of
being "ready to use." Counsel who would insist that the legislature
meant "prepared on the premises" or "prepared on the premises on
order" or "prepared on the premises on order for immediate consump-
tion on the premises" faces the difficulties implicit in the simple fact
that the legislature said "prepared."
There is further opportunity for dispute about the meaning of this
chapter. The phrase, "on the earnings and on all the property of the
employer used in the operation of said business" apparently contem-
plates the earnings and other assets of the general business establish-
ment. If a department store which operates a dining room is deemed to
come within the scope of the statutory coverage, are all of its employees
beneficiaries? Are all earnings and assets, including those in no sense
used in the dining room operations, drawn into the lien? A like question
exists wherever the food and drink dispensing activity of the employer
is not the employer's sole business.
It seems pretty obvious that the statute is ambiguous. Speculation
on the construction likely to prevail seems profitless and will not be
attempted here.
In subjecting the employer's earnings and business assets to the
employee's lien, the new statute follows the scheme of RCW 60.32.010
[RRS §1149]. This earlier legislation also relates to employees engaged
in the operation of the employer's business (as opposed to the various
construction and improvement types of'situation) and covers a wide
range of activity-railways, canals, transportation companies, water
companies, mines, manufacturing plants, sawmills, and lumber or tim-
ber companies. The period of unpaid employment, for which a lien right
exists, is six months under RCW 60.32.010 [RRS §1149], and three
months under the new statute.
Under Chapter 205 the employee is obliged to file his lien notice with
the auditor of the county in which the labor was performed, and to
serve or mail a copy on or to the employer, all within thirty days after
cessation of the labor. The mechanics of the statute, as to these details,
are not identical with those of some other lien statutes. The divergence
in the several Washington statutes in these particulars suggests the
need for a general over-haul of the statutory lien system, which has
been growing steadily and haphazardly since 1863.
In providing that the lien created thereby is prior in right to an
encumbrance which attached previously but which was not filed or
19531
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recorded "so as to create constructive notice thereof prior to that time,
and of which the lien claimant had no notice," the new statute may have
drifted into ambiguity again. It follows at this point the pattern set
in RCW 60.04.050, 60.08.030 and 60.20.020 [RRS §§ 1132, 1156 and
1155] These also avoid the clear and precise language-"this lien shall
be junior to an antecedent encumbrance duly filed." Two of these
statutes have been construed, and have been held to give the lienor a
position junior to an antecedent encumbrance duly filed. Chapter 205
will presumably receive the same construction.1 Since the issue is one
of fact and the new statute permits of argument, it may take litigation
to achieve the construction.
By way of contrast, it may be recalled that RCW 60.12.030 [RRS
§ 1188-3] (which relates to farm laborers' liens) contains a differently
worded priority clause. It reads: "The liens provided for in this chapter
-shall be preferred to any other encumbrance upon the crops to which
they attach." This language seems to mean that the lien is prior in right
to an earlier and properly filed chattel mortgage on the crops. It has
received that construction.' RCW 60.24.090 [RRS § 1165] (which
provides for timber and lumber workers' liens) states flatly- "The
liens provided for in this chapter are prior to any other liens. ," and
has also been held, without discussion, to give the lienor an interest
prior to that of an antecedent chattel mortgage.'
Substantially the same language in RCW 60.32.010 [RRS § 1149],
"no mortgage, deed or trust, or conveyance shall defeat or take prece-
dence over such lien," has received an exactly opposite construction.
The lien holder whose claim arises under this chapter is subordinate
to an earlier encumbrance duly filed or recorded.'
Why the priorities sections of the several statutes should be differ-
ently worded, why similar language in different chapters should be
differently construed, and why any labor lien should be prior in right
' Concerning RCW 60.04.050 [RRS § 1132] Lipscomb v. Exchange National
Bank, 80 Wash. 296, 141 Pac. 686 (1914) , Jahn & Co. v. Mortgage Trust & Say. Bank,
97 Wash. 504, 166 Pac. 1137 (1917), concerning RCW 60.08.030 [RRS § 1156]
Rothweiler v. Winton Motor Car Co., 92 Wash. 215, 158 Pac. 737 (1916) (which,
although directly concerned with the predecessor statute, says of the present version,
that it "reaffirms the standing of a chattel mortgage").
2 Sitton v. Lilienthal, 14" Wash. 624, 45 Pac. 303 (1896), Musgrave v. Atkinson,
118 Wash. 323, 203 Pac. 973 (1922).
3 Greely v. Bank of Stevenson, 169 Wash. 181, 12 P.2d 493 (1932).
4 Fitch v. Applegate, 24 Wash. 25, 64 Pac. 147 (1901), In re Cascade Fixture Co.,
8 Wn.2d 263, 111 P.2d 991 (1941).
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to an earlier encumbrance properly filed or recorded, are questions
which cannot be answered on the basis of the existing decisions.
WARRN L. SHATTUCK
CRIMINAL LAW
Subversion. The Subversive Activities Act of 1951' made criminal
all subversive activities2 knowingly engaged in. It also forbade public
employment to a "subversive person," defined to include a member of
any "subversive organization," and required every candidate for elec-
tion to any office to file an affidavit that he is not a "subversive person"
as defined. This latter provision was sustained as a valid condition of
becoming a candidate'for election to Congress in Huntatner v. Coe8 on
July 14, 1952. The supreme court, however, took pains to construe the
affidavit requirement to refer to the present situation of the candidate,
-as distinguished from past conduct or membership, and there is at least
a hint in the opinion that an affidavit negativing "knowing" member-
ship in any subversive organization would be all that could constitu-
tionally be required.' On December 15, 1952, in Wieman v. Updegraff,'
the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state to exact an oath from its own
employees negativing membership in any subversive organization re-
gardless of the employee's knowledge of the nature of the organization.
The discharge of an employee for "innocent" membership was branded
as "patently arbitrary."' At the same time, the majority of the Court
apparently sanctioned the use of test oaths limited to "guilty" member-
ship.
The 1953 legislature acted accordingly by amending the definition of
"subversive person" to exclude a person whose only dereliction is mem-
bership in a "subversive organization" unless such membership is
attended with knowledge of the subversive nature of the organization,"
I RCW 9.81.
2 Defined in the now familiar formula, essentially, the advocacy of the forcible
overthrow or alteration of the government.
8 40 Wn. 2d 767, 246 P2d 489 (1952).
4 Id. at 775-6. The court was "confident" that the attorney general could devise
a form of oath departing sufficiently from the terms of the statute to avoid unconsti-
tutionality. Id. at 778.
8344 U.S. 183 (1952).
Old. at 192.
7Id. at 188-90.
8 L. 1953, c. 142, § 1, amending RCW 9.81.010.
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